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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Markcus Raymond May appeals from the judgment of conviction entered
following his guilty pleas to aggravated battery and misdemeanor attempt to elude a
peace officer.

Mr. May asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it

denied his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. May was originally charged with aggravated battery with a deadly weapon
enhancement, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon enhancement, burglary, and
felony eluding a peace officer. (R., pp.101-04.) The State and Mr. May reached a plea
agreement under which he would plead guilty to aggravated battery with the deadly
weapon enhancement and misdemeanor eluding a peace officer, in exchange for which
the State would dismiss the remaining counts and agree to recommend "a 30 year
unified sentence consisting of 10 years fixed followed by 20 years indeterminate to be
served on Count I and a concurrent 6 months county jail for amended Count IV."
(R., p.242.)
As a condition of the plea agreement, Mr. May waived the right to file an Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion, except one alleging an illegal sentence,
and the right to "appeal any issues regarding the conviction, including all matters
involving the plea or the sentencing and any rulings made by the court, including all
suppression issues." He retained the right to "appeal the sentence if the Court exceeds
the fixed portion of the State's sentencing recommendation of the 'Jail/Prison terms' set
forth above." (R., p.242.}
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Pursuant to the plea agreement, on January 27, 2011, Mr. May pleaded guilty to
aggravated battery with a deadly weapon enhancement and misdemeanor eluding a
peace officer.

(Plea.Tr., p.19, L.25 - p.21, L.16.)

pleading guilty, Mr. May received conflict counsel.

Approximately six weeks after
(R., p.253.) Approximately three

months after pleading guilty, conflict counsel filed a motion to withdraw Mr. May's guilty
pleas, with a brief in support of that motion. (R., pp.264-71.) Both Mr. May and his
former attorney testified at an evidentiary hearing on the motion. (Tr., p.11, L.15 - p.52,
L.21, p.57. L.13 - p.63, L.3, p.65, L.1 - p.85, L.4.)
Mr. May testified that he only pleaded guilty because he ;'had no choice" and
"was being threatened" by his attorney. (Tr., p.12, Ls.15-19.) The threats and pressure
that he identified as coming from his attorney were that if he went to trial he'd "definitely
be doing the full time on sentencing, which was, like, 65 years or something[,]" and that
It would be harder on me in prison. He went to the full extent. I told him I
didn't want to go to prison because I didn't want to meet Bubba. And he
said, "what's wrong with Bubba?" in essence what's wrong with me being
raped.
(Tr., p.17, L.8 - p.18, L.19.) Mr. May also explained that his attorney told him that he
wouldn't "defend me at trial, because I was going to get time anyway, so what was the
point, so I mean, I had - I felt I had no choice but to take a deal." (Tr., p.21, L.19 - p.22,
L.1.)
Mr. May further testified that he did not understand that the plea agreement that
he accepted involved a potential thirty-year prison sentence for the aggravated battery
charge. Specifically, he believed that the offer, which was for the State to recommend a
unified sentence of thirty years, with ten years fixed, meant that "they are going to
suspend 20, erase it, and then that was going to leave 10 to serve in total." (Tr., p.15,
Ls.12-19.) It was only after he discussed the case with fellow inmates (Tr., p.30, Ls.7-
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15), that he learned that he "could do the full 30" if he didn't get paroled. (Tr., p.15,
Ls.19-23.) He also testified that he did not understand what a unified sentence was,
explaining, "I don't even know what the word 'unified' means" (Tr., p.17, Ls.1-7), and
that, at the time he pleaded guilty, he did not know what the term "indeterminate" meant.
(Tr., p.62, Ls.15-18.) Mr. May provided a letter from his former defense attorney, dated
February 17, 2011, in which he acknowledged receipt of written requests that Mr. May
wished to withdraw his guilty pleas. (Defendant's Exhibit 8.)
The State then called Mr. May's former attorney who testified that he never told
him that he would receive a sixty-five year sentence if he went to trial and was convicted
(Tr., p.73, Ls.20-23), and that, based on their numerous discussions, he believed that
Mr. May understood what the term "indeterminate" meant. (Tr., p.71, Ls.3-6.) Relevant
to Mr. May's testimony that he would not represent him if it went to trial, his former
attorney testified that, had he not entered guilty pleas, he would have been prepared to
go to trial and that Mr. May was aware that was the case. (Tr., p.84, L.16 - p.85, L.2.)
With the stipulation of the parties that it could do so, the district court also
listened to a recording of a phone call, marked as "Exhibit A," that Mr. May made to his
mother approximately one hour after he entered his guilty pleas.
R., p.293.)

(Tr., p.5, Ls.1-8;

The call included a discussion of the plea deal that Mr. May had just

accepted, specifically that the prosecutor would ask for "ten fixed" with the defense free
to argue for less time, meaning that his sentence would be "ten or less." (Exhibit A,
1:15 to 1:36.)
Mr. May argued that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas for two
reasons:

(1) because he was pressured into pleading guilty, and (2) that he did not

understand legal terms contained in the plea agreement.
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(Tr., p.86, Ls.1-20.)

In

opposing Mr. May's motion, the State argued that Mr. May had failed to establish "a just
or reasonable basis" to withdraw his guilty plea.

The State further argued that

Mr. May's attorney did not coerce him into pleading guilty, and that the Idaho Criminal
Rule 11 plea colloquy and his answers to the written guilty plea advisory form support a
finding that his pleas were made voluntarily and knowingly. (Tr., p.91, L.10 - p.93, L.2.)
When it denied Mr. May's motion, the district court applied the six-factor analysis
recognized by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in interpreting a nearly-identical
federal rule. (Tr., p.108, L.12 - p.114, L.14 (citing United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245
(4 th Cir. 1991).) The district court identified those six factors as:
One, whether the defendant has offered credible evidence that his plea
was not knowing or not voluntary. Two, whether the defendant has
credibly asserted his legal innocence. Three, whether there has been a
delay between the entering of the plea and the filing of a motion. Four,
whether the defendant has had close assistance of competent counsel.
Five, whether the withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government. And
six, whether it will inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources.
(Tr., p.108, L.21 - p.109, L.7.)
The district court found no weight to the third factor (delay). (Tr., p.112, Ls.1325.)

With respect to the fifth factor (prejudice to the government), the district court

concluded that the State had not demonstrated that it would be prejudiced in any way if
Mr. May was allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas. (Tr., p.113, Ls.12-14.) With respect
to the first factor (credible evidence that the plea was not knowing or voluntary), the
district court found that there was no credible evidence to support a finding that the
pleas were not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, especially in light of the
"extensive[]" Rule 11 hearing, which had been conducted "in a detailed fashion."
(Tr., p.111, Ls.15-23.)

As for the second factor (a credible assertion of legal

innocence), the district court found that there had "been absolutely no such assertion in
4

these proceedings." (Tr., p.111, L.24 - p.112, L.1.) As for the sixth factor (waste of
judicial resources), the district court concluded that it "absolutely" would inconvenience
the court and waste judicial resources to allow Mr. May to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Finally, with respect to the fourth factor (close assistance of competent counsel), the
district court concluded,
I've known [defense counsel] for the majority of the time he's been in the
public defender's office. I found him competent. I have never found him
to be someone who is coercive in nature or practices trickery with the
court or anyone else; and whether that is vouching for his credibility, I
certainly can take notice that he was, and is, a competent attorney insofar
as what he does before this court.
(Tr., p.113, Ls.1-11.) The district court also found Mr. May's testimony at the hearing to
be not credible. (Tr., p.105, L.22 - p.106, L.3.)
Mr. May was then given a unified sentence of thirty years, with ten years fixed,
on the charge of aggravated battery with a weapon enhancement (R., p.326), and six
months in jail for the misdemeanor attempt to elude charge. (R., p.312.) Mr. May filed
a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas and the judgment of conviction. (R., p.330.)

5

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. May's motion to withdraw
his guilty pleas?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. May's Motion To Withdraw
His Guilty Pleas
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) governs the withdrawal of guilty pleas, and provides:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made only before sentencing
is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest
injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction
and permit the defendant to withdraw defendant's plea.
Id.

"When a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made before sentencing, a defendant
need only demonstrate 'just reason' for withdrawal of the plea." State v Stone, 147
Idaho 330, 333 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219 (2008) and
State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799 (1988)). A post-sentencing motion must satisfy a higher

standard, that of "manifest injustice," in order "to insure that the accused is not
encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential punishment and withdraw the
plea if the sentence is unexpectedly severe." Id. (citing State v. Creech, 109 Idaho 592
(1985) and State v. Freeman, 110 Idaho 117 (Ct. App. 1986)).
If a defendant demonstrates that a plea was not made knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily, it constitutes a due process violation, and such a showing satisfies both
the "manifest injustice" standard and the lesser "just reason" standard. Id. "However, a
constitutional defect in the plea is not necessary in order to show either a 'just reason'
or 'manifest injustice."' Id. (citing State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 886 (Ct. App. 2000) and
State v. Henderson, 113 Idaho 411 (Ct. App. 1987)). "Where a fair and just reason ...

has been presented, and no prejudice to the state has been shown, the defendant is
entitled to liberal allowance of his request for a trial." State v. Henderson, 113 Idaho
411,414 (Ct. App. 1987).
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When it denied Mr. May's motion, the district court applied a six-factor analysis
recognized by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in interpreting a nearly-identical
federal rule. (Tr., p.108, L.12-p.114, L.14 (citing United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245
(4 th Cir. 1991 ).) The district court identified those six factors as:
One, whether the defendant has offered credible evidence that his plea
was not knowing or not voluntary. Two, whether the defendant has
credibly asserted his legal innocence. Three, whether there has been a
delay between the entering of the plea and the filing of a motion. Four,
whether the defendant has had close assistance of competent counsel.
Five, whether the withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government. And
six, whether it will inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources.
(Tr., p.108, L.21 - p.109, L.7.)
The district court found no weight to the third factor (delay). (Tr., p.112, Ls.1325.)

With respect to the fifth factor (prejudice to the government), the district court

concluded that the State had not demonstrated that it would be prejudiced in any way if
Mr. May was allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas. (Tr., p.113, Ls.12-14.) With respect
to the first factor (credible evidence that the plea was not knowing or voluntary), the
district court found that there was no credible evidence to support a finding that the
pleas were not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, especially in light of the
"extensive(]" Rule 11 hearing, conducted "in a detailed fashion." (Tr., p.111, Ls.15-23.)
As for the second factor (a credible assertion of legal innocence), the district court found
that there had "been absolutely no such assertion in these proceedings " (Tr., p.111,
L.24 - p.112, L.1.) As for the sixth factor (waste of judicial resources), the district court
concluded that it "absolutely" would inconvenience the court and waste judicial
resources to allow Mr. May to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Finally, with respect to the

fourth factor (close assistance of competent counsel), the district court concluded,
I've known [defense counsel] for the majority of the time he's been in the
public defender's office. I found him competent. I have never found him
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to be someone who is coercive in nature or practices trickery with the
court or anyone else; and whether that is vouching for his credibility, I
certainly can take notice that he was, and is, a competent attorney insofar
as what he does before this court.
(Tr., p.113, Ls.1-11.)
There are several problems with the district court's Moore-based analysis. First,
in Moore, the Fourth Circuit found it to be "most important[]" that the defendant was "a
lawyer and former governor assisted by competent counsel" which left the Court
unconvinced that his plea was not knowing and voluntary.

Id. at 248.

Mr. May is

neither a lawyer nor a former governor, and testified that he did not understand the
terms of the agreement which he now seeks to void.
With respect to the competency of counsel factor, the Court, in Moore, held that
''[c]ompetency of counsel is not questioned." Id. This is, again, different from Mr. May's
case, in which he alleged that his attorney had threatened him with a sixty-five year
prison sentence if he went to trial, and told him that he would not defend him at trial
because doing so would be pointless. Thus, one could hardly conclude that Mr. May
had not challenged his counsel's competency, and the district court's reliance on its
awareness of defense counsel's competent performance in other cases did nothing to
resolve whether defense counsel had provided competent representation in Mr. May's
specific case.

Furthermore, the district court erred when it improperly took judicial

notice of its own memory and/ or became a witness in the proceeding. See I.R.E. 201
(no provision for taking judicial notice of a court's memory) and 605 (prohibiting a judge
from being a witness in a case over which he is presiding).
Finally, with respect to the judicial resources factor, the Moore Court found
further litigation "would have been futile" because "[t]here was no substance to Moore's
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claims." 1 Id. at 249. This presents another difference between Mr. May's claims and
the Moore case. Mr. May's claims were substantive, and, therefore, allowing Mr. May to
have his trial would not have wasted judicial resources in the same way as allowing
further litigation of Moore's motion would have.
As noted above, the Idaho Court of Appeals has explained, "Where a fair and just
reason has been presented, and no prejudice to the state has been show, the
defendant is entitled to liberal allowance of his request for a trial."

Henderson, 113

Idaho at 414. Here, the district court found that the State had not shown that it would be
prejudiced if Mr. May was allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas. (Tr., p.113, Ls.12-14.)
As such, the question in this case amounts to whether Mr. May met his burden of
demonstrating a fair and just reason for withdrawing his guilty pleas, and whether the
district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion.
Mr. May asserts that both his testimony that he felt pressured into accepting the
plea offer and that he did not understand the terms of the plea offer constituted just and
fair reasons to allow him to withdraw his guilty pleas. He further asserts that the district
court's findings, that his testimony was not credible, were clearly erroneous,2 especially
in light of the contemporaneous statement that he made to his mother about his
understanding that the deal was for a maximum sentence of ten years fixed, and the
district court abused its discretion when it denied the motion. In light of the lack of any

1

In Moore, the Court was asked to reverse because Moore's request for an evidentiary
hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas had been denied. It appears that the
Court's focus on this factor centered on whether further hearings on his motion would
have been pointless, not specifically whether an eventual trial would have been
wasteful.
2
See Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 637 (2006) ("A trial court's findings of fact will
not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous") (citing Camp v. East Fork
Ditch Co., Lt., 137 Idaho 850 (2002) and Idaho R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
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evidence to support the district court's finding that his attorney was competent, it was
clearly erroneous for the district court to find his attorney to have been competent based
on its own memory of other cases. 3 Finally, Mr. May asserts that, in light of its finding
that the State had not established that it would be prejudiced, the district court abused
its discretion when it focused on the Moore six-factor analysis, rather than simply
deciding whether he had established a fair and just reason under Henderson.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. May respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this matter
DATED this 1ih day of December, 29'f1''t

t•JS?ER J. HAHN
Q.~puty"~tate Appellate Public Defender
''•··-,c·~,/'

3

Idaho Rule of Evidence 201, governing judicial notice, provides no basis upon which a
district court can take judicial notice of its own memory. I.R. 201. Additionally, Idaho
Rule of Evidence 605 prohibits a judge from being a witness in a case over which he is
presiding. I.RE. 605.
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